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What the Supreme Court Should Do: Save Sentencing
Reform, Gut the Guidelines

a
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RAPPAPORT
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Professor of Law,
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Law.

The legal community has been deeply troubled about
the likely outcome of the Supreme Court's rulings in
Booker and Fanfan. Commentators appear to be coalescing around two opposing positions. Both groups expect
the decisions to be highly unsatisfying.
One group can see no plausible distinction between
the sentencing scheme struck down in Blakely and the
federal sentencing guidelines. As a result, they expect
the Court to find the guidelines unconstitutional, which
could mean the end of sentencing reform in America.
The second group believes that the Court will decline to
overturn the guidelines on pragmatic grounds, fearing the
havoc such a decision would cause. This group expects the
Court to distinguish the federal system on the grounds
that Blakely applies to statutory, but not administrative,
sentencing schemes.' The problem for this group is that
no one seems able to explain why that line is justified,
which means the Court will elevate an arbitrary distinction
to the level of constitutional significance.
Both of these positions share the same basic concern,
that no principled distinction can be made between an
administrative rulemaking system and a statutory one.
In this paper, I argue that this conclusion is mistaken
for a simple reason. It fails to recognize that a principled
rationale for the Supreme Court's Apprendi and Blakely
decisions can be identified, a rationale that provides a basis
for distinguishing the two kinds of sentencing regimes,
at least in some circumstances.
At the same time, this analysis does not imply that the
federal sentencing system necessarily withstands constitutional scrutiny. Rather, the more nuanced understanding
of Blakely and Apprendi generates a specific test for evaluating whether administrative schemes survive review. It
is a test the federal sentencing guidelines may not pass,
at least absent significant restructuring.
This analysis provides a preliminary attempt to ground
the Apprendi and Blakely decisions on deeper constitutional values. It does not aspire to be comprehensive and,
in the press of time, the discussion passes over some
important issues quickly. Nonetheless, my hope is that
this effort will encourage further debate about the logic of
the Court's decisions.
The analysis is briefly sketched out in the following
two parts. Part One examines the core principle that lies

implicit in the Blakely and Apprendi decisions. Part Two
looks at the implications of that principle for the federal
guideline system.
I. The Logic of Apprendi and Blakely
How should Blakely and Apprendi be interpreted? It

seems difficult to read those cases as being compelled by
the text or original intent of the Sixth Amendment or the
Due Process clause. At best, the relevant constitutional text
is ambiguous, at worst it offers no support for the Court's
holding. Thus, if Blakely and Apprendi are thought to
be legitimate precedent, they must be viewed through
a different interpretive lens. They must be viewed as
illustrations of what might be called, for want of a better
phrase, common law constitutional decisionmaking2
Under such an approach, the Court seeks, in a step
by step manner, to develop a constitutional rule that
promotes the nation's core values and goals. Often, in
common law rulemaking, the underlying rationale of a
group of decisions is obscure at first even to the Justices.
However, the hope is that over time a coherent and
appealing rule will emerge from the mix of decisions.
If such a rule can be identified, the Court must then
determine whether the rule promotes social welfare and
fundamental fairness. If it passes muster, the rule will
serve as a standard for deciding future cases.
This interpretive approach raises the obvious question:
Do the Court's decisions in Apprendiand Blakely embody
an appealing rule or principle? Many commentators have
concluded that they do not, that no logic underlies the
court's precedent in this area.3 Before we dismiss the entire
body of law, however, it is worth exploring in greater detail
whether a justified principle can be discovered. Several
possibilities immediately spring to mind.
One possible rationale for the decisions was mentioned by Justice Kennedy in his Blakely dissent. Kennedy
suggested that the Court's decision reflects a critical
view of the judges' role at sentencing, and specifically its
role in identifying facts that trigger statutory sentencing
increases. 4 If such facts are to be identified, the argument
goes, they must be found by a jury at trial.
Does this principle help explain the Court's decisions
in Apprendi and Blakely? No, it does not. After all, the
Court's rulings permit a trial court to make sentencing
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decisions in an indeterminate sentencing scheme, a
scheme in which judges have even greater discretion to
determine the ultimate sentences than in determinate
systems. Thus, it does not make sense to say that the core
holding of these cases is a distrust of judicial sentencing
power.
Kennedy's dissent does, however, point us in the right
direction, in the sense that Blakely and Apprendi can
be viewed as judgments about institutional roles. Rather
than viewing the decisions as judgments about judicial
power, a more plausible approach is to view them as
reflecting a profound distrust of the legislature's role in
sentencing policy. The idea, simply stated, is that when
the legislature identifies a factor as being relevant to the
sentencing maximum, and assigns a weight to that factor,
then higher procedural protections must apply.
A natural question is why such a distrust should be
part of our legal firmament. The answer is not difficult to
see. Such a distrust is consistent with both the structure of
our constitutional system and the protections embodied
in specific provisions of the constitution, such as the Due
Process clause.
Perhaps most obviously, the core structure of our
constitutional system is based on a distrust of legislative
power, particularly where that power is used to infringe on
individual liberty. That distrust reflects a historic fear of the
tyranny of the majority. As Mill wrote, the strongest of all
the arguments against public interference with individual
liberty "is that, when it does interfere, the odds are that
it interferes wrongly and in the wrong place. " 5 Those
dangers are particularly acute in the criminal justice field,
where public passions may lead to legislative overreaching
or ill-considered rules.6
The Court's interpretation of the Due Process clause
lends further credence to this view. 7 The clause recognizes that social welfare requires a balancing of private
and public interests. Where core liberties are at stake,
the Due Process clause imposes significant protections
against legislative overreaching - requiring, for example, compelling justifications for state action. Needless
to say, in the sentencing field, the most essential human
liberties are at stake, which explains why protections from
legislative abuse are especially important in this context. 9
The basic distrust of legislative power does not extend
with the same force to judicialdecisionmaking. The reason
reflects the judiciary's different institutional structure and
perspective. Because federal judges enjoy life tenure, they
are more insulated from political pressures and, hence,
the danger of overreaching is diminished." Moreover,
because the sentencing judge must confront the individual
defendant in the case, there is greater opportunity to see
the individual as a human being, not an abstraction. Both
factors mean that the judiciary will likely be more sensitive
to individual interests in deciding cases and imposing
punishments. Indeed, the judiciary's historic role is to
protect individual liberty againstlegislative overreaching."
The Court' jurisprudence assumes that constitutional

FEDERAL

SENTENCING

protections that apply to legislative rulemaking need not
apply to the exercise of judicial power."
The question that must be addressed next is what sort
of sentencing rule might vindicate this core distrust of
legislative power in the sentencing arena. In Apprendi and
Blakely, the Court offered an initial answer. Apprendidealt
with legislation that increased the statutory maximum
upon specific judicial findings. Blakely involved legislation
that increased the maximum presumptive sentence that a
defendant might receive, based on specific factual findings
by the court. Both kinds of legislation potentially expose
the defendant to heightened punishment, and so raise
concerns about legislative abuse.
The rule adopted in Blakely and Apprendi is a plausible
response to these concerns. In those cases, the Court
imposed strict procedural burdens on the government
whenever legislation provides for an increase in the
permissible or presumptive maximum sentences based
on a factual finding. Specifically, the increased sentence
will be authorized only if the government proves the
triggering facts at trial.
This procedural rule will have several beneficial effects. First, the ruling may cause the legislature to pause
before enacting these provisions, since the statutes would
likely increase the cost of already unwieldy trials. Ideally,
Congress would limit the provisions to those factors that
appear most essential to promoting social goals. Second,
the rule forces prosecutors to prove the triggering facts
under the strictest standard of proof, ensuring that the
maximum sentence is not increased without strong evidentiary support. Third, and perhaps most importantly,
the approach authorizes the jury to make the necessary
findings of fact. In doing so, the constitutional rule gives
the jury an opportunity to nullify overly-severe laws at
trial.' 3 In this sense, the rule helps promote the jury's
4
fundamental "liberty protecting" role.'
Of course, the modest procedural burden imposed by
the Court may prove ineffectual. Despite the restrictions,
the legislature may continue to enact excessively severe
legislation that raises the statutory maximum, ignoring
the increased costs of jury fact-finding. The jury, in turn,
might implement the harsh sentencing rules without
reflection, failing to fulfill its responsibility as a defender
of liberty. If these events occur, further remedial steps
by the Court may be necessary. But as a first step in
addressing legislative abuse, the rule adopted by the Court
in Apprendi and Blakely is not an implausible one.
The principle that underlies these cases makes intuitive
sense, and it is consistent with the constitutional structure
and the text of the Due Process clause. It is not, however,
consistent with all Court precedent. Specifically, it is not
consistent with the Court's decision in Harris, where
the Court held that constitutional protections do not
apply to mandatory minimum statutes. The problem
with this ruling is that mandatory minimum legislation
seems to implicate serious concerns about legislative
overreaching.
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As Justice Thomas wrote in his Harris dissent, a
mandatory minimum typically has a far greater impact on
a defendant's sentence than a statutory maxima.' 5 Mandatory minimums often effectively determine the sentence
that the defendant will receive. Thus, if constitutional
limitations on legislative power are necessary in the sentencing field, those protections would seem critical in the
case of mandatory minimum statutes, as well.
The implications of this analysis is that the Court
6
should reconsider and reverse its holding in Harris.'
Overturning Harris would extend the benefits of the
Apprendi and Blakely rulings to this critical context. It
would impose the highest standard of proof for facts
triggering mandatory minimum sentences. It would
discourage the legislature from enacting those statutes
in the first place. And it would permit the jury to serve
as a check against legislative abuse. Reversing Harris,in
short, would help establish an institutional structure for
sentencing that is more consistent with a core distrust of
legislature power in the sentencing realm.
II. Implications for the United States Sentencing
Guidelines
The preceding analysis identifies a plausible and appealing rationale for the Court's decisions in Apprendi and
Blakely (though not Harris), a rationale that justifies
imposing procedural restrictions on legislative sentencing. Understanding the rationale helps to clarify whether
similar restrictions should be applied to administrative
rulemaking in the sentencing field. The answer is that
such protections should apply if a sentencing commission
poses the same dangers as a legislature. And that depends
primarily on a "functional analysis" - an analysis of the
institutional roles and biases of the Commission. 7 Specifically, this approach requires an assessment of whether the
Commission poses the same danger of overreaching the same threat to individual liberty - as the legislature.
This analysis turns on the same factors that underlie
the constitutional distrust of the legislative power. Two
considerations seem particularly relevant. First, we noted
that the susceptibility of the legislature to majoritarian
passions is a key factor in justifying restrictions on legislative fact finding. Whether or not the Commission faces
the same problems depends in part on its institutional
structure. Is the Commission structured in a way that ensures its institutional independence? Or is it structured in
a way that makes it highly vulnerable to political pressure
and legislative meddling?
Second, we noted that the judiciary's direct exposure
to the defendant makes the institution more sensitive
to the effects of excessive punishment. The legislature's
distance from the human subject - its tendency to view
the defendant as an abstraction - makes it a particularly
dangerous organ of sentencing policy. The question again
is whether the Commission is structured in a way that
ensures it will take into account the concrete human
impact of its rules.
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The analysis would be an easier one if the U.S. Sentencing Commission were comprised solely of federal
judges (say, as a body of the Judicial Conference), and
if its sentencing choices were not subject to legislative
interference. In that case, it would plainly have a degree of insulation from political pressures. Moreover,
a Commission comprised of active judges would have
first-hand familiarity with the effects of its rules on
offenders.
The issue is far less clear in the case of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission. On one hand, certain aspects of
the Commission's organizational structure encourage a
degree of political independence, such as the requirement
that Commissioners be appointed to six-year staggered
terms. But on the other hand, there are many reasons to
doubt the Commission's ability to act independently of
political pressures.
As an initial matter, the Commissioners are all nominated through the ordinary political channels. In establishing the Commission, Congress made no effort to
ensure a neutral appointment process, such as through
the establishment of a bipartisan review board to nominate Commissioners. Moreover, under current law, no
more than three members of the Commission may be
federal judges. In theory, the entire Commission could be
made of non-judges.
The history of the sentencing guidelines - well documented in the pages of the Federal Sentencing Reporter
- raises further doubts about the Commission's institutional ability to withstand political pressures. Since its
founding, the Commission has been subject to widespread
criticism for its political responsiveness.8 Justice Scalia's
warning that the Commission represents a "junior varsity
legislature" appears to be sadly prescient.
Finally, as Steven Chanenson argues, recent statutory
changes have undermined the Commission's independence in further and dramatic ways.'9 Specifically, in
April 2003, Congress enacted the so-called PROTECT
Act.2 Chanenson observes that the Act blurs the lines
between administrative and legislative rulemaking. In
addition to reducing the number of judges that may
serve on the Commission, the Act directly "amended
guidelines to [Congress'] own specifications," while "prohibit[ing] the Sentencing Commission from creating
certain new guidelines. " "2The result is that "at least some
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been enacted
directly by Congress."22
These concerns raise serious questions about whether
the Commission, as it is presently structured, can withstand constitutional review under the principle implicit
in Blakely and Apprendi.3 At the same time, the analysis
presented here does not mean that the Court has created
an insurmountable obstacle to sentencing reform in the
future. So long as the Congress establishes a Commission
with sufficient guarantees of independence, an administrative rulemaking system will survive review. If this
analysis is followed, Blakely might not mark the end of
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sentencing reform. It might instead mark the beginning of
real sentencing reform, the kind of reform commentators
have long been waiting to see.
Notes

2

3

Several circuit courts have upheld the federal guidelines on
these grounds. United States v. Reese 2004 WL 1846076
(11 th Cir. Sept 2, 2004) (refusing to apply Blakely to federal
guidelines);United States v. Hammoud, 2004 WL 2005622
(4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2004) (same); United States v. Koch, 2004
WL 189930 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2004) (suggesting that
"differences between the sentencing provisions at issue in
Blakely and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines may well have
constitutional significance"); United States v. Pineiro, 377
F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Mincey,
350 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2004) (refusing to apply Blakely to
guidelines pending Supreme Court decisions in Booker and
Fantan).
See generally David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U.CHI. L. REV.877 (1996).
See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (June 24,
2004) (O'Connor dissenting) ("[I]t is difficult forme to
discern what principle besides doctrinaire formalism actually
motivates today's decision."); Frank Bowman, Train Wreck?
Or Can the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Be Saved? A Plea for
Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 42, Crim. L. Rev.__
(forthcoming 2004) (The Court "can distinguish the federal
sentencing system ...on the, frankly, specious, ground that
Washington's sentencing ranges were set by statutes ...
However, to do so would ...expose the Court to ridicule for
indulging in transparent evasion of precedent on which the
ink is scarcely dry ....).
Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (The
Court's ruling reflects "a faintly disguised distrust of judges
and their purported usurpation of the jury's function in
criminal trials.").
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 151 (Penguin Books 1984)

(1859).
6

7

8

A range of commentators have discussed the distorting
influence of legislative politics on criminal lawmaking. See,
e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001); Douglas A. Berman, A
Common Law For This Age of Federal Sentencing: The
Opportunity and Need For Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'y REV. 93, 107-09 (1999); Ronald F.Wright, Three Strikes
Legislation and Sentencing Commission Objectives, 20 LAW&
POL'Y 429, 437 (1998).
The Court's ruling in Blakely was ostensibly grounded on the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. See Blakely, 124 S.Ct.
at 2538 (holding that the state sentencing scheme "did not
comply with the Sixth Amendment."). In my view, the line of
cases makes more sense when understood as an expression
of Due Process values.-See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 243 n.6 (1999) (Souter, J.) (emphasizing that the
principles underlying the Court's ruling reflects both Sixth
Amendment and Due Process values); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
477 (stressing that the rights at stake include "constitutional
protections of surpassing importance," including the "due
process of law"). At the very least, Due Process values color
the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in these cases.
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
279 (1990) ("'[W]hether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his
liberty interests against the relevant state interests."')
(internal citations omitted); Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497,
542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Due Process "has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon
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postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society").
This is not to suggest that the legislature lacks redeeming
characteristics. Sentencing decisions, for example, require
complex judgments about policy, and the legislature is
arguably better suited to make those judgments than any
other branch. As a result, concerns about legislative abuse
must be balanced against an awareness of the legislature's
institutional advantages. Nonetheless, some degree of
skepticism about the legislature must be assumed ifwe are
to make sense of the Court's decisions in Apprendi and
Blakely. After all, if one thought that the legislature poses a
minimal danger to individual liberty, then the procedural
protections announced in those cases makes little sense.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that nothing in these cases
prevents the legislature from enacting sentencing rules. The
decisions only call for special procedural safeguards if the
legislature chooses to do so.
,o In state systems where judges are appointed or elected to
fixed terms, one might expect a reduced degree of judicial
independence. In these states, greater skepticism of judicial
sentencing decisions may be warranted, though arguably not
to the point of imposing the same procedural restrictions
on the judiciary as are applied to the legislature. In New
Jersey, the jurisdiction in Apprendi, judges serve an initial
seven-year term and then can be appointed by the governor
to life tenure. See N.J. CONST. art. VI. In Washington State,
the jurisdiction in Blakely, Supreme Court judges must stand
for reelection every six years. WASH. REV. CODEANN.
§ 2.04.071 (2004).
Alexander Hamilton observed that the institutional structure
of the judiciary - life tenure, protected salaries - serves to
insulate the judiciary from majority will and make it a natural
defender of individual liberty. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
No. 78
(Alexander Hamilton) ("This independence of judges is
equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of
individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts
of designing men, or the influence of particular conjectures,
sometimes disseminate among the people themselves ...").
'2
At the same time, it is a mistake to ignore the potential
shortcomings of the judiciary. Judicial sentencing decisions
can be deeply flawed. A judge can impose a sentence that is
based on discriminatory or arbitrary considerations. She can
increase a sentence based on evidence of dubious validity
(under a preponderance standard). She can be sensitive to
political pressures just like the legislature, especially if the
judge is an elected official. See infra n.10. Ifthose concerns
are found to be significant, the Court may ultimately decide
to extend procedural protections to certain sentencing
decisions by the judiciary, as well.
'3
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (quoting
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ONTHELAWSOFENGLAND 349
(T. Cooley ed. 1899)) (the grand and petit juries represent a
"'strong and two-fold barrier ... between the liberties of the
people and the prerogative of the [government]."'); Jones,
526 U.S. at 245 (Souter, J.) ("The potential or inevitable
severity of sentences was indirectly checked by juries'
assertions of a mitigating power when the circumstances of a
prosecution pointed to political abuse of the criminal process
or endowed a criminal conviction with particularly
sanguinary consequences."). See also United States v. Khan,
325 F. Supp. 2d 218 *33 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (Weinstein, J.)
(The jury "expresses the view of a sometime compassionate
free people faced with an individual miscreant in all his or
her tainted humanity, as opposed to the abstract cruelties of
a more theoretical and doctrinaire distant representative
government."). For a perceptive analysis of the jury's role in
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protecting individual liberty, see Rachel Barkow, Recharging
the Jury: the Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV.33 (2003).
14 See Barkow, supra note 13, at 64. In theory, judges can also

5

serve this role. However, good reasons may exist to believe
that a jury is more likely than a judge to disobey or nullify an
excessively severe sentencing statute. See, e.g., id. at 61 (A
jury "does not need to give any reason for an acquittal, and it
faces no review by a court or legislature. It therefore has a
greater opportunity than a judge to check the state and these
general punitive laws.").
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 577-78 (2002)
(Thomas, J. dissenting) ("As a matter of common sense, an
increased mandatory minimum heightens the loss of liberty
and represents the increased stigma society attaches to the
offense. Consequently, facts that trigger an increased
mandatory minimum sentence warrant constitutional
safeguards."); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 563 (Breyer, J.
dissenting) ("[A]s a practical matter, a legislated mandatory
'minimum' is far more important to an actual defendant"

6

than any maxima.).
Reversing Harris would not necessarily lead to less severe
minimum sentences. A legislature might respond to such a
decision by eliminating specific mandatory statutes, while
raising sentences across the board. Thus, rather than
establishing mandatory minimum sentences for drug
transactions involving a specified amount of drugs, the
legislature might simply raise the minimum sentence for all
drug offenses regardless of drug amount.
At the same time, if Harris is overturned, the legislature
would face certain constraints in taking such evasive action.
Notably, in a post-Harris world, any fact that increases a
statutory minimum must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial. If the legislature increases sentences across
the board, the jury might then refuse to convict. The
increased risk of jury nullification might discourage the
legislature from raising sentences excessively.
Nonetheless, if this check on legislature overreaching
proves ineffective, the Court may need to adopt additional
remedial steps. Various options might be imagined, from
substantive scrutiny of mandatory minimum statutes to
permitting courts to disclose the mandatory minimum
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sentence to the jury, further encouraging the jury to serve as
a counterweight to legislative abuse.
See Douglas Berman, Formalism Meets Functionality: An Ohio

1

Case Study (Saturday, August 28, 2004), in Sentencing Law
and Policy Blog, at http://sentencing.typepad.com (last
visited September 6, 2004).
See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of

21

Federal Criminal Sentencing Policy; Or, Confessions of Two
Reformed Reformers, 9 GEo. MASON L. REV.1001, 1008, 1019
(2001) ("[T]he 1989 amendments to the robbery and fraud
guidelines both involved gratuitous increases in punishment
levels that had no basis in either principle or practice, and
instead were essentially political decisions reflecting
responses to interest group pressures."). See generally Aaron
J. Rappaport, Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing
Commission's Troubling Silence about the Purposes of
Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 1043 (2003).
See Steven C. Chanenson, Hoist With Their Own Petard?, 17
FED. SENT. REP. 20 (2004).
Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21.
Chanenson, supra note 19.

22

Id.
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Such a ruling would not contravene the Court's decision in
Mistretta, where the Court held that the Sentencing
Commission was an independent body situated in the judicial
branch. As a formal matter, that case involved a Separation
of Powers challenge, not a Due Process or Sixth Amendment
issue. Moreover, Mistretta was decided before the Guidelines
became fully operational. Evidence of the Guidelines'
operation over the past 18 years has raised questions about
the Supreme Court's prediction that the Commission would
serve as a neutral voice of sentencing policy. Moreover,
recent statutory changes pursuant to the PROTECT Act have
raised further questions about the Commission's
independence. Thus, even if Mistretta were relevant to this
case, "changed facts" would justify the reconsideration of the
ruling as binding precedent. See Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (observing that precedent
can be overruled when "facts have so changed, or come to be
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.").
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